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This study examined the impact of merger between Price Waterhouse and 
Coopers & Lybrand in 1998 on audit concentration in Malaysian audit 
market. The market share of publicly listed companies for audit firms before 
the merger (1997 and 1998) and post merger (1999, 2000 and 2001) for each 
of industry category were perused. Concentration ratio for the Big Four audit 
firms (CR4) and Herfindahl Index (HI4) were used as methods to identify the 
level of concentration. Result showed that merger did increase the 
concentration level of the audit market significantly. 
Introduction 
Year 1998 marked another history in accounting world when Coopers & Lybrand 
and Price Waterhouse finally merged to create the world largest accounting and 
consulting firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). Less than ten years before 
(1989), two major public accounting firms took place. In about a decade, the 
public accounting industry has consolidated from 'Big 8' to 'Big 5' (Payne and 
Stocks, 1998). 
Some observers believe that the merger activity is primarily driven by factors 
from the international practices of the accounting firms involved. Another reason 
can be that the increased concentration or market shares of auditors and the 
return to scale opportunities offered from a combined larger firm (Minyard and 
Tabor, 1991). However, a number of concerns have risen regarding the effect of 
increasing concentration on competition among accounting firms. These 
concerns focussed on possible monopoly power, the loss of objectivity and 
independence, reduction in consumer choice and the related impact on the 
value of audit report if a few firms were allowed to dominate the industry. 
According to 'Public Accounting Firm: A Mandated Study on Consolidation 
and Competition' (2003), a report from United States General Accounting Office, 
the audit market now is in the midst of unprecedented change and evolution 
and thereby becoming more highly concentrated. 
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Thus, this study seeks to determine the impact of merger between Price 
Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand on audit concentration in Malaysian audit 
market. Concentration in an industry refers to the extent to which economic 
activity is controlled by large firms. The implications of greater concentration 
for audit services market includes the strengthening of an oligopolistic supply 
with consequent enhanced potential for price fixing arrangements and reduction 
in consumer choice. 
Literature Review and Theoretical Development 
The recent mergers of public accounting firms that reduced the Big 8 to the Big 
6 and now to the Big 4 attracted many researchers to study their impacts on 
various issues such as audit fee, audit delay and auditor concentration. The 
earliest study done by Zeff and Fossum (1967) presented data of public 
accounting firm as classified in The Fortune Directory 1965. The data consist of 
narrative and statistic data of sales, asset and (net) income of large United 
States public accounting firms and was broken down by auditors on industry-
by-industry basis. The study provided information such as how public 
accounting firms grew and developed. However no conclusion was provided in 
the study. 
It was an extended work of auditor concentration in specific industries that 
Eichenseher and Danos (1981) explored auditors concentration by providing 
two major information that are measures of the current levels of auditor 
concentration in 54 industries and measures of the strength of association 
between levels of concentration and levels of plausible causes of concentration. 
A related result was a little evidence that auditor concentration among large 
public clients increased substantially over 11 years from 1964 to 1975 and 
finally it was found that the positive relationship between concentration and 
explanatory variables such as capital market activity (client revenues and number 
of clients). 
After audit firms started to merge many researchers were interested to 
examine the consequences. Among the researchers were Minyard and Tabor 
(1991) analysed the effects of actual and proposed Big 8 mergers on auditor 
concentration and to present a discussion in support of the Herfindahl Index as 
a preferred concentration measure for the auditing industry. The merger of AY 
(Arthur Young) and EW (Ernst & Whinney) and of DHS (Deloitte, Haskin & 
Sells) and TR (Touche Ross) appeared to have had only a minimal effect on 
auditor concentration. Finally it was found that the mergers of AY with EW and 
DHS with TR might have had a little, if any, impact on competition within the 
market structure for auditing services provided by large firms. 
Wooton and Tonge (1994) extended the study by investigating the impact 
on two mergers of Big 8 accounting firms and compared the effect of pre and 
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post merger on auditors' concentration. Using Herfindahl Indices and 
concentration ratio they examined the effects of mergers upon concentration 
on NYSE, AMEX and OTC companies. Concentration also was examined on 
the basis of audit fee of the major accounting firms. The study discussed the 
impacts of the merger, both at the level of the individual firms involved and at 
the level of the client audit industry. The results indicated that merger resulted 
in increased concentration ratios, whether measured by number of firms audited, 
client revenues, or audit fees, at the four, six and eight firm levels. 
Yardley et al., (1992) discussed the nature of competition in the market for 
audits and CPA firms' behaviour in this competitive environment. They provided 
information about audit market structure, determinants of that market structure, 
and CPA firm behaviour and performance in the United States. However it was 
mentioned that no single measurement contains sufficient information to 
determine the nature of competition in the industry, and market structure, 
determinants of structure firm behaviour, and firm performance. 
Lenz (1996) examined on market of auditing services with respect to credit 
institution in Germany. A part of the paper covered a survey on concentration 
measures and the market share of auditing firms with regard to credit 
institution.The comparison was done between the concentration of market for 
auditing services regarding the credit institution segment with industrial and 
Commercial Stock Corporations. They concluded that the concentration in Credit 
Institution was higher than other segments of auditing market. 
Narasimhan and Chung (1998) explored the concentration of audit services 
provided to companies listed on stock exchanges of Canada, Hong Kong, 
London and Singapore. The results discussed the concentration of audit service 
based on concentration ratios and Herfindahl Indices measured by the total 
number of companies audited and the total assets of these companies for the 
four stock exchanges examined. In all of the four markets, the results indicated 
a lack of competition even at the four firm levels. 
Payne and Stocks (1998) investigated the impact of Public Accounting firm 
mergers. They discussed the impact of merger on audit market changed and the 
implication of industry concentration. It was indicated that significant levels of 
competition remained after the merging of 'Big Eight' to 'Big Six'. It was found 
that the 'Big Five' audited a large share of each exchanges company in 1996 
when compared to 1988. They also emphasised on the new PriceWaterhouse 
Coopers (after merger) became the dominant firm among 'Big Five', auditing 
more companies, and companies with greater market values. 
Ivancevich and Zardhoodi (2000) analysed and explored the 1989 accounting 
firm mega mergers. Data for the firms involved in the mergers were compared to 
data for competitor firms involved in the mergers (direct rivals) to help to control 
the effect of market forces. The results of data analysis suggested increase 
efficiencies within the audit market that were then passed through to end-users 
in the form of lower prices. 
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A recent study on the impact of accounting firm merger and the impact of 
concentration was by Thavapalan, Moroney and Simnett (2002). They reviewed 
the impact of the PriceWaterhouse Coopers merger on auditor concentration in 
Australia. Using four-firm concentration ratios pre-and post- merger for each 
industry, the merger was found to have had an effect on auditor concentration 
and market share. Following the merger they found that the percentage clients 
and audit fee from the top four auditing firm increased. Furthermore, the merger 
was found to not necessarily decreased competition. 
Beattie et al., (2003) observed audit market concentration in United Kingdom. 
They examined the extent and nature of concentration within the UK listed 
companies as at April 2002, and pro forma, after the collapse of Andersen was 
documented and analysed. The result showed a significant increased in 
concentration. The result also emphasized on the impact of concentration on 
competition however it was reported to be difficult to predict, but there was a 
little evidence to suggest that previous increases in concentration has reduced 
competitiveness in the market. 
All of the studies discussed above were done in a developed and mature 
audit markets. The present study replicates and extends this investigation in a 
developing country that is growing important in the world economy. To our 
knowledge, there is no study on audit concentration market to empirically examine 
the impact of auditor merger on audit market concentration in Malaysia. 
There were two studies that analysed the audit market concentration in 
Malaysia. They were Takiah et al., (2000) and Takiah and Aini (2003). The first 
study provided empirical evidence on the market distribution of audit service 
among the Big Six and non- Big Six audit firms and the industry specialisation of 
those firms. They also examined the characteristics of audit clients. Results 
showed that Big Six audit firms dominate about 60 percent of the market audit 
share. They also found that the audit market share is not equally distributed 
among Big Six firms. 
Takiah and Aini (2003) had examined the effects of the different bases of 
measurement in determining audit market distribution among audit firms and in 
ascertaining industry specialisation of Big Six audit firms. The overall results 
showed that for most Big Six firms, the market share based on the amount of 
audit fee is significantly higher than that based on the number of clients. The 
findings indicated that the share of the audit market is very much influenced by 
size of the client. 
However, the methods used in these studies were merely based on simple 
percentage basis. Previous studies used Concentration Ratio and Herfindahl 
Index as measurement as both takes into accounts the relative market share. 
These two studies did not use these conventional measures of concentration. 
Furthermore, the present study examines the impact of merger on audit market 
concentration using longitudinal data. 
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Changes in market concentration occur for three main reasons: voluntary 
realignments, changes in the set of consumers and changes in the set of suppliers. 
New listings, insolvencies and mergers also play a role, although the overall 
direction of impact is unpredictable. Major increase in concentration may occur 
when leading suppliers disappear from the market either through merger or 
demise (Beattie et al., 2003). 
With the formation of PricewaterhouseCoopers in 1998 and the dissolution 
of Arthur Anderson in 2002, the audit market for publicly traded companies will 
be controlled by only four public accounting firms. One of the benefits for 
corporate mergers is synergy, which is defined as the ability to maximise the 
complimentary strengths of the uniting organizations to achieve certain 
objectives (Lawrence and Glover, 1998). Synergy is generally measured in the 
post-acquisition period by an organization's ability to penetrate new markets, 
increase existing markets share and enhance revenue and market-based ratios 
such price-earning ratios. 
Hilwani et al., (2003) had investigated the effects of audit firm merger on 
audit fee in Malaysia. They found that the merger did not affect audit fee. 
Although there were differences in the audit fee charged (pre- and post merger), 
the differences were not statistically significant. However, the merger is believed 
to have enhanced better quality in performing audit task as resources are pooled 
and distributed more efficiently. Hilwani et al., (2004) found that the merged 
firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers improved its efficiency as compared to those of 
non-merged firms. This is evident by the reduced audit lag taken to issue 
annual reports during post merger years. 
Given the evidence in prior literature, it is expected that the auditor merger 
would affect the audit market concentration. Whilst these studies were mostly 
examined in the developed market, the effect is likely to occur in the Malaysian 
market because these audit firms are international firms and any significant 
event in the origin country is likely to affect their counterparts elsewhere in the 
world. However, given the differences in legal, economic and institutional 
environments in Malaysia, the observed impact may not be present. Hence, it is 
hypothesised that (in null form), 
H01: Audit firms merger do not affect audit market concentration 
Methodology 
To measure auditor concentration, the concentration ratio and Herfindahl Index 
are utilised. These two measures are commonly calculated in previous studies 
as discussed earlier. The concentration ratio is the proportion of total size 
sector accounted for the largest x number of audit firms, where the size sector is 
taken into account of both the number of audit clients within an industry sector 
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and the proportion of that sector's audit fee earned by the largest x audit firms. 
This is consistent with Thavapalan et al. (2002) and Wootton et al. (1994). 
The concentration ratio is calculated as follows: 
n 
1 
C n = 
k 
I 
Where by: k = total number of audit firms 
n = the number of largest firms considered 
S.= the size of audit firm (proxy by number of audit clients, or the 
audit fee in a particular industry) 
The Herfindahl Index provides a concentration measure that is a composite 
function of both number of auditors active in an industry and the dispersion of 
activity among those auditors (Minyard and Tabor, 1991). Within a given 
industry, the Herfindahl Index varies between a minimum base level (1 /N) and 
1.0. The base level is 1.0 divided by the number of auditing firms available (e.g. 
eight for the Big 8, resulting in a base level = 0.125), whether or not a particular 
auditing firm is active within the industry. Observed Herfindahl Index varies 
above the base level due to unequal dispersion of activity among auditing firms 
within an industry (Minyard and Tabor, 1991). 
Herfindahl Index is another widely used measure to encapsulate market 
concentration (Thavapalan et al., 2002 and Wootton et al., 1994). It is the sum of 
squares of the shares of industry activity possessed by the k most active audit 
firms in the industry (Thavapalan et al., 2002), calculated as follows: 
k 
US2 
I 
H I = 2 
k 
1 
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Where by: k = most active audit firms in the industry 
S.= the size of audit firm (proxy by number of audit clients, or the 
audit fee in a particular industry) 
Previous studies has argued that Herfindahl Index is a better measure of 
concentration than concentration ratio as it takes into account the relative 
market share of the leading suppliers in an industry (Thavapalan et al., 2002 and 
Wootton et al., 1994). 
Results 
The companies observed were those listed in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
for the five years. In 1997 there were 708 companies listed in the KLSE, 736 in 
1998,757 in 1999,795 in 2000 and 812 in 2001. However, not all companies are 
included in the research due to incomplete/unavailable data, companies being 
suspended or de-listed, newly listed companies for a particular year and 
companies that changed their financial year-end. 
Table 1 describes sample selection process. A total of 3031 annual reports 
were suitable for inclusion in the final data of concentration ratio for the five 
years: 611 (1997), 657 (1998), 678 (1999), 588 (2000) and 497 (2001). For Herfindahl 
Index calculation, we used 2239 annual reports for the five years: 477 (1997), 479 
(1998), 492 (1999), 433 (2000) and 358 (2001). The reason for the difference is due 
to the calculation of Herfindahl Index, which is based on the auditees of the 
four most dominant audit firms in terms of number of clients or audit fee in the 
industry. 
Table 1: Selection Process 
Concentration Ratio 
Herfindahl Index 
1997 
611 
477 
1998 
657 
479 
1999 
678 
492 
2000 
588 
433 
2001 
497 
358 
The KLSE classification of companies listed on its main and second boards 
includes construction, consumer products, hotels, infrastructure project 
companies, industrial products, mining, plantation, properties, technologies, 
trading/services, trust, closed-end fund and finance. Out of those sectors, 
trust, closed-end fund and finance are not included in this research because 
they are highly regulated, governed by different authorities and have different 
legal requirements. 
Further analysis of number of audit clients are presented in Table 2 (1997), 
Table 3( 1998), 4 (1999), 5 (2000) and 6 (2001). 
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Table 2 shows that the Big 6 dominates the market in the year 1997 having 
concentration ratio of 50% or more in seven industries. The Big 6 dominates all 
clients in Infrastructure sector and 92% of the Hotel sector. The four firm 
concentration ratio in Plantation and Technology sectors are 74% and 46% 
respectively indicating the dominance of the Big 6 in these companies (see 
Table 2). The four-firm Herfindahl Index moves closer to 0.25 indicating that the 
audit clients were equally distributed in the Infrastructure and Industrial product 
sectors, (having HI4 = 0.25), while a particular audit firm may dominate clients of 
other sectors. 
Table 2: Number of Audit Clients of Big 6 in 1997 (Percentage of Industry 
Market Share in Parenthesis) N = 611 
Industry 
Construction 
Consumer Product 
Hotel 
Infrastructure 
Industrial Product 
Mining 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trading Services 
Total/Ave HI 
PW 
4 
(7.4) 
8 
(10.4) 
2 
(8.3) 
0 
(0) 
23 
(12) 
1 
(11.1) 
1 
(3.2) 
4 
(5.6) 
1 
(7.7) 
15 
(11.1) 
59 
(9.7) 
CL 
3 
(5.6) 
3 
(3.9) 
1 
(4.2) 
EY 
9 
(16.7) 
0 
(0) 
17 
(70.8) 
1 0 
(33.3) (0) 
19 
(10) 
31 
(16.1) 
3 2 
(33.3) (22.2) 
2 
(6.5) 
9 
(29) 
10 8 
(14.1) (11.3) 
2 1 
(15.4) (7.7) 
12 
(8.8) 
56 
(9.2) 
27 
(20) 
104 
(17) 
KPMG 
13 
(24.1) 
12 
(15.6) 
3 
(3.9) 
1 
(33.3) 
32 
(16.7) 
3 
(33.3) 
7 
(22.6) 
7 
(9.9) 
2 
(15.4) 
14 
(10.4) 
94 
(15.4) 
DEL 
0 
(0) 
7 
(9.1) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
15 
(7.8) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
4 
(5.6) 
0 
(0) 
10 
(7.4) 
36 
(5.9) 
AA 
5 
(9.3) 
16 
(20.8) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(33.3) 
25 
(13.0) 
1 
(11.1) 
6 
(19.0) 
16 
(22.5) 
2 
(15.4) 
24 
(17.8) 
95 
(15.5) 
Others 
20 
(37.0) 
31 
(40.3) 
1 
(4.2) 
0 
(0) 
47 
(24.5) 
2 
(22.2) 
6 
(19.0) 
22 
(31.0) 
5 
(38.5) 
33 
(24.4) 
167 
(27.3) 
CR4 
(%) 
57.4 
46.75 
91.67 
100 
57.81 
58.33 
74.19 
49.30 
46.15 
59.26 
HI4 
0.30 
0.27 
0.36 
0.25 
0.25 
0.31 
0.29 
0.28 
0.27 
0.27 
0.26 
Note: CR4 is for the largest four individual audit firms 
HI is based on four most active audit firms 
PW = Price Waterhouse, CL = Coopers & Lybrand, EY = Ernst & Young, KPMG 
= KPMG, DEL = Deloittes, AA = Arthur Andersen, Others = Other audit firms 
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Table 3 represents the results during the year of merger. Note that separate 
column is provided for the merged firm (i.e. PwC). Since the merger occurred in 
the middle of the year 1998, we provide three columns to represent the PW, CL 
and PWC. Ernst and Young had the biggest number of clients (16.5%; 1997:17%), 
closely followed by KPMG( 16.2%, 1997:15.4%) and AA (16.03%; 1997 15.5%). 
Hotel, Infrastructure, Mining and Plantation sectors are the industry with highest 
concentration ratio of the largest four firms. The Herfindahl Index shows that 
domination of a particular audit firm exists in each industries. 
Table 3: Number of Audit Clients of Big 6 in 1998 (% of Industry Market 
Share in Parenthesis) N = 657 
Industry 
Construc-
tion 
Consumer 
Product 
Hotel 
Infra-
structure 
Industrial 
Product 
Mining 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trading 
Services 
Total/ 
Ave HI 
PW 
4 
(7.8) 
7 
(7.0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
20 
(9.5) 
1 
(7.7) 
1 
(3.1) 
3 
(4.1) 
0 
(0) 
13 
(9.2) 
49 
(7.5) 
CL 
3 
(5.9) 
3 
(3.0) 
1 
(14.2) 
1 
(33.3) 
18 
(8.5) 
3 
(23.1) 
1 
(3.1) 
9 
(12.3) 
1 
(7.7) 
11 
(7.8) 
51 
(7.8) 
PWC 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
7 
(3.3) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(3.1) 
2 
(2.7) 
1 
(7.7) 
3 
(2.1) 
14 
(2.1) 
EY 
10 
(19.6) 
17 
(17) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
34 
(16.1) 
2 
(15.4) 
9 
(28) 
8 
(10.9) 
1 
(7.7) 
27 
(19.1) 
108 
(16.5) 
KPMG 
15 
(29.4) 
14 
(14) 
3 
(42.9) 
2 
(66.7) 
38 
(18) 
3 
(23.1) 
6 
(18.7) 
7 
(9.6) 
3 
(23.1) 
15 
(10.6) 
106 
(16.2) 
DEL 
0 
(0) 
8 
(8) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
14 
(6.6) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
4 
(5.5) 
1 
(7.7) 
12 
(8.5) 
39 
(6) 
AA 
6 
(11.8) 
17 
(17) 
2 
(28.6) 
0 
(0) 
26 
(12.3) 
2 
(15.4) 
8 
(25) 
17 
(23.3) 
2 
(15.4) 
25 
(17.7) 
Others 
23 
(45.1) 
34 
(34) 
1 
(14.3) 
0 
(0) 
54 
(25.6) 
2 
(15.4) 
6 
(18.8) 
23 
(31.5) 
5 
(38.5) 
35 
(24.8) 
105 183 
(16.03) (28) 
CR4 
(%) 
55.74 
51.00 
85.71 
100 
54.98 
76.92 
75 
56.16 
50.0 
55.32 
HI4 
0.31 
0.27 
0.36 
0.44 
0.26 
0.26 
0.34 
0.28 
0.29 
0.27 
0.25 
Note: CR4 is for the largest four individual audit firms 
HI is based on four most active audit firms 
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In 1999 (post merger) the minimum concentration ratio of the Big 5 increased 
to 58% (see Table 4) indicating an increase in Big 5 domination. Infrastructure, 
Mining and Plantation remain as the sector dominated by the largest four firms 
with bigger ratios than the previous year. However, concentration ratio for 
Hotel sector remained 85.7%. KPMG audited 17% of the market (1998:16.2%), 
followed closely by the merged firm, PwC (16.7%) and Ernst and Young (16.7%; 
1998:16.5%). The Herfindahl Index shows that the audits clients are normally 
distributed among the firms (having index close to 0.25 in most industries) 
except for Hotel, Infrastructure and Plantation. 
Table 4: Number of Audit Clients of Big 5 in 1999 (% of Industry Market 
Share in Parenthesis) N = 678 
Industry 
Construction 
Consumer 
Product 
Hotel 
Infrastructure 
Industrial 
Product 
Mining 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trading 
Services 
Total/Ave HI 
PWC 
5 
(7.8) 
11 
(10.4) 
1 
(14.3) 
2 
(50) 
41 
(18.6) 
4 
(30.8) 
4 
(11.8) 
16 
(21.6) 
3 
(20) 
26 
(18.5) 
1 13 
(16.7) 
EY 
12 
(18.8) 
17 
(16) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(25) 
37 
(16.8) 
2 
(15.4) 
8 
(23.5) 
8 
(10.8) 
1 
(6.7) 
27 
(19.1) 
1 13 
(16.7) 
KPMG 
15 
(23.4) 
18 
(17) 
3 
(43) 
1 
(25) 
42 
(19.1) 
3 
(23.1) 
7 
(20.6) 
7 
(9.5) 
3 
(20) 
17 
(12.1) 
1 16 
(17.1) 
DEL 
1 
(1.6) 
9 
(8.5) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
15 
(6.8) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
4 
(5.4) 
1 
(6.7) 
9 
(6.4) 
39 
(5.8) 
AA 
6 
(9.4) 
16 
(15.1) 
2 
(28.6) 
0 
(0) 
30 
(13.6) 
2 
(15.4) 
9 
(26.5) 
18 
(24.3) 
3 
(20) 
25 
(17.7) 
111 
(16.4) 
Others 
25 
(39.1) 
3 5 
(33) 
1 
(14.3) 
0 
(0) 
5 5 
(25) 
2 
(15.4) 
6 
(17.6) 
21 
(28.4) 
4 
(26.7) 
37 
(26.2) 
186 
(27.4) 
CR4 
(%) 
59.38 
58.50 
85.71 
100 
68.18 
84.62 
82.35 
66.22 
66.67 
67.38 
HI4 
0.28 
0.23 
0.36 
0.37 
0.25 
0.27 
0.25 
0.29 
0.28 
0.26 
0.26 
Note: CR4 is for the largest four individual audit firms 
HI is based on four most active audit firms 
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In the year 2000, the overall Big 5 concentration ratio increased to a minimum 
of 60% (see Table 5). The domination of Big 5 in the Technology sector increased 
to 71% (1999: 67.7%). The increments are also obvious in the Construction 
(62.71; 1999: 59.4%) and Consumer Product (60.2%; 1999: 58.5%) sectors. The 
clients were mostly audited by Ernst and Young (18.5%; 1999: 16.7%) and 
KPMG (16%; 1999:17%). The Herfindahl Index shows that the markets were 
fairly distributed except for Hotel and Infrastructure sectors. 
Table 5: Number of Audit Clients of Big 5 in 2000 (% of Industry Market 
Share in Parenthesis) N = 588 
Industry PWC EY KPMG DEL AA Others CR4 
(%) 
HI4 
Construction 
Consumer 
Product 
Hotel 
Infrastructure 
Industrial 
Product 
Mining 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trading 
Services 
Total/Ave HI 
6 
(10.2) 
1 1 
(12.5) 
1 
(33.3) 
2 
(50) 
30 
(16.8) 
1 
(5.6) 
6 
(19.3) 
14 
(17.9) 
2 
(28.6) 
20 
(16.5) 
93 
(15.8) 
11 
(18.6) 
1 1 
(12.5) 
1 
(33.3) 
1 
(25) 
36 
(20.1) 
5 
(27.8) 
10 
(32.2) 
12 
(15.4) 
0 
(0) 
22 
(18.2) 
109 
(18.5) 
13 
(22) 
17 
(19.3) 
1 
(33.3) 
0 
(0) 
36 
(20.1) 
1 
(5.6) 
5 
(16.1) 
6 
(7.7) 
1 
(14.3) 
14 
(11.6) 
94 
(16) 
1 
(1.7) 
7 
(7.9) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
16 
(8.9) 
3 
(16.7) 
0 
(0) 
4 
(5.13) 
1 
(14.3) 
4 
(3.3) 
36 
(6.1) 
7 
(11.9) 
14 
(15.9) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
20 
(11.2) 
4 
(22.2) 
5 
(16.1) 
16 
(20.5) 
2 
(28.6) 
26 
(21.5) 
94 
(16) 
21 
(35.6) 
28 
(31.8) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(25) 
41 
(22.9) 
4 
(22.2) 
5 
(16.1) 
26 
(33.3) 
1 
(14.3) 
35 
(29) 
162 
(27.6) 
62.71 
60.23 
100 
75.0 
68.16 
61.10 
83.87 
61.54 
71.43 
67.77 
0.25 
0.26 
0.33 
0.56 
0.26 
0.25 
0.27 
0.27 
0.28 
0.26 
0.26 
Note: CR4 is for the largest four individual audit firms 
HI is based on four most active audit firms 
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Table 6: Number of Audit Clients of Big 5 in 2001 (% of Industry Market 
Share In Parenthesis) N = 497 
Industry 
Construction 
Consumer 
Product 
Hotel 
Infrastructure 
Industrial 
Product 
Mining 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trading 
Services 
Total/Ave HI 
PWC 
6 
(11.5) 
7 
(9.6) 
1 
(50) 
1 
(33.3) 
24 
(15.7) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(17.2) 
12 
(20.3) 
2 
(40.1) 
18 
(17.5) 
76 
(15.3) 
EY 
8 
(15.4) 
10 
(13.7) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(33.3) 
31 
(20.1) 
5 
(29) 
10 
(34.5) 
6 
(10.2) 
0 
(0) 
17 
(16.5) 
88 
(17.7) 
KPMG 
10 
(19.2) 
15 
(20.5) 
1 
(50) 
1 
(33.3) 
31 
(20.1) 
1 
(5.9) 
4 
(13.8) 
5 
(8.5) 
1 
(20) 
8 
(7.8) 
77 
(15.5) 
DEL 
1 
(1.9) 
6 
(8.2) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
14 
(9.1) 
2 
(11.8) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(3.4) 
0 
(0) 
8 
(7.8) 
33 
(6.7) 
AA 
5 
(9.6) 
13 
(8.2) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
17 
(11) 
5 
(29.4) 
6 
(21) 
14 
(23.7) 
1 
(20) 
23 
(22.3) 
84 
(16.9) 
Others 
22 
(42.3) 
22 
(30.1) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
37 
(24) 
4 
(23.5) 
4 
(13.8) 
20 
(33.9) 
1 
(20) 
29 
(28.1) 
139 
(28) 
CR4 
(%) 
55.77 
61.64 
100 
100 
66.88 
64.71 
86.21 
62.71 
80.00 
64.08 
HI4 
0.27 
0.26 
0.50 
0.33 
0.26 
0.30 
0.28 
0.29 
0.38 
0.29 
0.27 
Note: CR4 is for the largest four individual audit firms 
HI is based on four most active audit firms 
In the year 2001, a slight decrease in the minimum concentration ratio to 
55% (see Table 6). The Hotel and Infrastructure sectors are totally audited by 
the largest four firms. The trend in Mining and Plantation sectors remained very 
much as the previous years. However, concentration ratio of the Technology 
sector shows an increase to 80% (1999:71%). The Herfindahl Index shows that 
domination of a particular firm exist in most of the industries (most indices 
increased as compared to those of year 2000). 
Table 7 - Table 11 exhibits the concentration ratios and Herfindahl Index 
based on audit fee data. Where audit fees are concerned, the Big 6 dominated 
most of the industries having more than 50% of the total of fees in 1997 (See 
Table 7). The Herfindahl Index of each industry is more than 0.25 indicating 
domination of audit firms prevail in each industry. 
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Table 7: Audit Fees (RM '000) for Each of the Big 6 in 1997 (% of Industry 
Market Share in Parenthesis) N = 611 
Industry 
Construction 
Consumer 
Product 
Hotel 
Infrastructure 
Industrial 
Product 
Mining 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trading 
Services 
Total 
PW 
513 
(4) 
1,428 
(9.7) 
-
-
3,118 
(13.3) 
41 
(2.6) 
426 
(8.2) 
1,859 
(11.3) 
180 
(15.4) 
10,771 
(27.5) 
18,336 
(15.8) 
CL 
810 
(6.3) 
378 
(2.6) 
79 
(5.4) 
61 
(64.2) 
1,401.3 
(6) 
215 
(13.6) 
152 
(2.9) 
3,418 
(20.7) 
160 
(13.7) 
5,227 
(13.4) 
11,901.3 
(10.3) 
EY 
3,995 
(31.2) 
3,368 
(23) 
-
-
3,048 
(13) 
416 
(26.3) 
816.4 
(15.8) 
1,103 
(6.7) 
45 
(3.9) 
9,012 
(23) 
21,803.4 
(18.8) 
KPMG 
4,363 
(34) 
2,321 
(15.8) 
482 
(33) 
35 
(36.8) 
3,602 
(15.4) 
577 
(36.4) 
2,142 
(41.4) 
601 
(3.6) 
424 
(36.3) 
1,490.2 
(3.8) 
16,037.2 
(13.8) 
DEL 
. 
736 
(5) 
-
-
1,717 
(7.3) 
-
-
439 
(2.7) 
-
2,925 
(7.5) 
5,817 
(5) 
AA 
567 
(4.4) 
1,077 
(7.4) 
378 
(25.9) 
-
2,268 
(9.7) 
200 
(12.6) 
958.3 
(18.5) 
2,298 
(13.9) 
204.1 
(17.5) 
6,058.2 
(15.5) 
14,008.6 
(12.1) 
Others 
2,575 
(20.1) 
5,343.5 
(36.5) 
522.3 
(35.7) 
-
8,266 
(35.3) 
135 
(8.5) 
677.8 
(13.1) 
6,786 
(41.1) 
154.71 
(13.2) 
3,636.15 
(9.3) 
28,096.46 
(24.2) 
CR4 
(%) 
73.6 
55.93 
58.85 
100 
51.39 
77.9 
83.96 
52.54 
73.05 
69.87 
ffl4 
0.38 
0.27 
0.43 
0.54 
0.26 
0.30 
0.37 
0.25 
0.26 
0.27 
Note: CR4 is for the largest four individual audit firms 
HI is based on four most active audit firms 
In the year of merger (1998), the largest four firms dominate the audit 
market in terms of fee (see Table 8), having a minimum concentration ratio of 
53%. The Herfindahl Index also shows that certain firms dominated the 
proportion. 
The concentration ratio in the year 1999 (see Table 9) shows that the largest 
four firms had substantial portion of the audit fee, while the Herfindahl Index 
again shows that certain firms dominated the market. 
Table 8: Audit Fees (RM '000) for Each of the Big 6 in 1998 (% of Industry 
Market Share in Parenthesis) N = 657 
Industry 
Construc-
tion 
Consumer 
Product 
PW 
842 
(4.4) 
1,918 
(9.2) 
CL 
709 
(3.7) 
354 
(1.7) 
PWC 
-
EY 
4,457 
(23.5) 
3,893 
(18.8) 
KPMG 
4,486 
(23.7) 
4,799 
(23.1) 
DEL 
682 
(3.3) 
AA 
5,388 
(28.4) 
2,363 
(11.4) 
Others 
3,060.6 
(16.2) 
6,747.8 
(32.5) 
CR4 HI4 
(%) 
80.10 0.39 
62.5 0.34 
Continued 
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Table 8 (Continue) 
Hotel 
Infrastruc-
ture 
Industrial 
Product 
Mining 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trading 
Services 
Total 
274 
(19.5) 
-
2,881 
(10.1) 
56 
(3.1) 
497 
(6.1) 
1,586 
(10.1) 
-
12,468 
(26.9) 
20,522 
(14.3) 
48 
(3.4) 
651 
(87.3) 
1,419.1 
(5) 
265 
(14.5) 
179 
(2.2) 
1,614 
(10.3) 
100 
(7.8) 
4,745 
(10.2) 
10084.1 
(7) 
-
-
1,308 
(4.6) 
-
13 
(0.2) 
319 
(2) 
45 
(3.5) 
1,363 
(2.9) 
3,048 
(2.1) 
-
-
3,450 
(12.1) 
416 
(22.8) 
3.517.8 
(43.3) 
1,287 
(8.2) 
55 
(4.3) 
9,880 
(21.3) 
26,955.8 
(18.8) 
482 
(34.4) 
95 
(12.7) 
6,515 
(22.8) 
555 
(30.4) 
2,502 
(30.8) 
458 
(2.9) 
428 
(33.2) 
1,510 
(3.3) 
23,327.4 
(16.2) 
-
-
1,756 
(6.2) 
-
-
536 
(3.4) 
30 
(2.3) 
-
-
2,697 
(9.4) 
311 
(17.1) 
461.5 
(5.7) 
3,072 
(19.6) 
257.9 
(20) 
3,520.2 8,777 
(7.6) 
21,830 
(15.2) 
(18.9) 
599.09 
(42.7) 
-
8,524 
(29.9) 
221 
(12.1) 
959.9 
(11.8) 
6,781 
(43.3) 
374.31 
(29) 
4,072.4 
(8.8) 
23,327.4 31,340.1 
(16.2) (21.8) 
53.88 
100 
54.44 
73.36 
85.83 
48.29 
57.42 
70.43 
0.48 
0.52 
0.32 
0.27 
0.43 
0.31 
0.37 
0.32 
Note: CR4 is for the largest four individual audit firms 
HI is based on four most active audit firms 
Table 9: Audit Fees (RM '000) for Each of the Big 5 in 1999 (% of Industry 
Market Share in Parenthesis) N = 678 
Industry 
Cons t ruc t ion 
Consumer 
P roduc t 
Hote l 
Infrastruc-
ture 
Industrial 
P roduc t 
Min ing 
P l a n t a t i o n 
P W C 
1,075 
(8.4) 
1,195 
(5.2) 
54 
(4) 
165 
(69 .9 ) 
5 ,471 .1 
(16) 
4 1 5 
( 2 2 . 5 ) 
1,112.1 
(41 .5 ) 
EY 
3,784 
(29 .4 ) 
3 ,593 
(15 .7 ) 
-
11 
(4.7) 
4 ,920 
(14 .4 ) 
417 .5 
( 2 2 . 6 ) 
1,051.6 
(39 .3 ) 
KPMG 
4 , 3 4 2 
(33 .7 ) 
8 ,469 
(37) 
4 8 4 
(35 .6 ) 
6 0 
(25 .4 ) 
1 0 , 6 3 7 
(31 .1 ) 
4 6 6 
( 2 5 . 2 ) 
-
DEL 
2 0 0 
(1.6) 
937 
(4 .1) 
-
-
1,983 
(5.8) 
-
-
AA 
4 1 2 
(3.2) 
2 ,492 
(10 .9 ) 
277 
(20 .4 ) 
-
2,597 
(7.6) 
3 1 2 
(16 .9 ) 
5 1 2 . 9 7 
(19 .2 ) 
O the r s 
3 ,055 .6 
(23 .7 ) 
6 ,142 .5 
(26 .9 ) 
545 .7 
(40) 
-
8,619 
(25 .2 ) 
2 3 6 
( 1 2 . 8 ) 
-
CR4 HI4 
(%) 
7 4 . 7 0 0 .46 
68 .99 0 .43 
5 9 . 9 0 0 .54 
100 0 .89 
69 .02 0 .41 
87 .22 0.35 
100 0 .44 
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Table 9 {Continue) 
Proper t i e s 
Techno logy 
Trading 
Services 
Tota l 
3 ,371 
(22 .4 ) 
2 0 0 
(15 .2 ) 
12 ,443 
(31 .1 ) 
2 5 , 5 0 1 . 2 
(19 .3 ) 
1,295 
(8.6) 
69 
(5.2) 
9 ,086 
(22 .7 ) 
2 4 , 2 2 7 . 
(18 .3 ) 
4 4 7 
(3) 
339 .3 
(25 .8 ) 
1,803.9 
(4.5) 
1 2 7 , 0 4 8 . 2 
(20 .4 ) 
7 5 6 
(5) 
35 
(2.7) 
1,933 
(4.8) 
5 ,844 
(4.4) 
3 ,132 
(20 .8 ) 
4 1 9 
(31 .9 ) 
8 ,171 
(20 .4 ) 
6 ,070 
(40 .3 ) 
2 5 2 . 9 6 
(21 .5 ) 
6 , 5 3 5 . 6 
(16 .4 ) 
18 ,324 .97 31 ,457 .36 
(13 .8 ) ( 23 .8 ) 
54.71 
78 .11 
78 .81 
i 
0.50 
0.43 
0.38 
Note: CR4 is for the largest four individual audit firms 
HI is based on four most active audit firms 
Referring to Table 10, the concentration ratio shows a domination of the 
largest four firm in year 2000, having the lowest ratio 40.46% in Infrastructure 
sector. Most Herfindahl Index showed an increased as compared to year 1999, 
indicating a domination of a particular firm existed in certain industries. 
Table 10: Audit Fees (RM '000) for Each of the Big 5 in 2000 (% of Industry 
Market Share in Parenthesis) N = 588 
Industry 
Construction 
Consumer 
Product 
Hotel 
Infrastruc-
ture 
Industrial 
Product 
Mining 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trading 
Services 
Total 
PWC 
876.15 
(11) 
2,138.36 
(11.3) 
54 
(9) 
150 
(35.9) 
4,144.899 
(14.9) 
171.9 
(8.5) 
966.3 
(15.8) 
5,752.575 
(34.7) 
140 
(18.7) 
12,507.743 
(28.2) 
26,901.927 
(21.4) 
EY 
2.685.063 
(33.6) 
1,432.17 
(7.6) 
237 
(39.5) 
19 
(4.5) 
3,932.606 
(14.1) 
441.134 
(21.9) 
1,869.5 
(30.6) 
2,583.495 
(15.6) 
-
13,476.492 
(30.4) 
26,676.46 
(21.3) 
KPMG 
1,238.8 
(15.5) 
8,207.94 
(43.4) 
309 
(51.5) 
-
11,084.659 
(39.9) 
174 
(8.6) 
1,965.5 
(32.1) 
646.2 
(3.9) 
133 
(17.7) 
2,072.893 
(4.7) 
25,831.995 
(20.6) 
DEL 
190 
(2.4) 
817.13 
(4.3) 
-
-
1,299.81 
(4.7) 
468.223 
(23.2) 
-
919.59 
(5.6) 
31 
(4.1) 
657 
(1.5) 
4,382.753 
(3.5) 
AA 
625.5 
(7.8) 
2,184.17 
(11.5) 
-
-
1,665.497 
(6) 
342 
(16.9) 
298.716 
(4.9) 
2,525.734 
(15.2) 
398 
(53) 
6,181.193 
(13.9) 
14,220.81 
(11.3) 
Others 
2,376.616 
(29.7) 
4,134.114 
(21.9) 
-
248.742 
(68.2) 
5,668.62 
(2) 
421.5 
(20.9) 
1,015.1 
(17.1) 
4,136.323 
(24.9) 
48.321 
(6.4) 
9,432.417 
(21.3) 
27,481.779 
(21.9) 
CR4 
(%) 
67.89 
73.82 
100 
40.46 
74.93 
55.93 
83.4 
71.10 
93.50 
77.24 
HI4 
0.44 
0.59 
0.51 
1.00 
0.51 
0.37 
0.44 
0.41 
0.62 
0.47 
Note: CR4 is for the largest four individual audit firms 
HI is based on four most active audii firms 
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The concentration ratios in year 2001 (Table 11) shows the largest four firm 
holds substantial portion of the audit fee. The Herfindahl Index indicates a 
domination of a particular firm in certain industries existed. 
Table 11: Audit Fees (RM '000) for Each of the Big 5 in 2001 (% of Industry 
Market Share in Parenthesis) N = 497 
Industry 
Construction 
Consumer 
Product 
Hotel 
Infrastruc-
ture 
Industrial 
Product 
Mining 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trading 
Services 
Total 
PWC 
1,023.25 
(18.5) 
2,136.04 
(9.5) 
65 
(18.4) 
90 
(47.1) 
4,060.488 
(17.5) 
-
1,057 
(14) 
2,995.944 
(27.8) 
169 
(24.3) 
11,075.988 
(43.3) 
22,672.71 
(23.1) 
EY 
823.622 
(14.7) 
6,579.69 
(29.4) 
-
23 
(12) 
3,690.294 
(15.9) 
537.3 
(29.3) 
4,679.5 
(61.8) 
1,541.441 
(14.3) 
-
4,169.231 
(16.3) 
22,044.078 
(22.5) 
KPMG 
919.819 
(16.6) 
7,462.11 
(33.3) 
289 
(81.6) 
78 
(40.8) 
8,831.682 
(38) 
163 
(8.9) 
581 
(7.7) 
381.3 
(3.5) 
152 
(21.9) 
1,478 
(5.8) 
20,335.911 
(20.7) 
DEL 
191 
(3.4) 
677.639 
(3) 
-
-
1,637.575 
(7) 
148.2 
(8.1) 
-
645.49 
(6) 
-
1,258.714 
(4.9) 
4,558.618 
(4.6) 
AA 
622.1 
(11.2) 
1,068.12 
(4.8) 
-
-
1,345.533 
(5.8) 
456.8 
(24.9) 
293.45 
(3.9) 
2,067.8 
(19.2) 
294 
(42.3) 
3,233.687 
(12.6) 
9,381.49 
(9.6) 
Others 
1,961.74 
(35.4) 
4,473.221 
(20) 
-
-
3,690.057 
(15.9) 
528 
(28.8) 
954.966 
(12.6) 
3.138.238 
(29.1) 
79.355 
(11.4) 
4.354.028 
(17) 
19,179.605 
(19.5) 
CR4 
(%) 
61.15 
77.0 
100 
100 
77.09 
63.12 
87.38 
64.87 
88.57 
78.05 
HI4 
0.41 
0.65 
1.00 
0.65 
0.48 
0.39 
0.72 
0.43 
0.55 
0.38 
Note: CR4 is for the largest four individual audit firms 
HI is based on four most active audit firms 
Table 12 is an extended analysis of concentration ratio for both number of 
audit clients and fees for all the five years to industry segment. Overall, the 
concentration ratio increase implying that the Big 4 is controlling the market. 
The ratio based on the number of audit client range from 56% to 100% in year 
2001 (46% to 100% in 1997). In terms of audit fee, the range is even greater i.e. 
61%to 100% in year 2001 (51%to 100% in 1997). 
Table 12: Summary of Concentration Ratio 
Industry /Year 
Construction 
Consumer 
Product 
1997 
No. of Audit 
clients fees 
57.4 73.6 
46.75 55.93 
1998 
No. of Audit 
clients fees 
55.74 80.10 
51.00 62.5 
1999 
No. of Audit 
clients fees 
59.38 74.70 
58.50 68.99 
2000 
No .of Audit 
clients fees 
62.71 67.89 
60.23 73.82 
2001 
No. of Audit 
clients fees 
55.77 61.15 
61.64 77.0 
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Table 12 (Continue) 
Hotel 
Infrastructure 
Industrial 
Product 
Mining 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trading 
Services 
91.67 
100 
57.81 
58.33 
74.19 
49.30 
46.15 
59.26 
58.85 
100 
51.39 
77.9 
83.96 
52.54 
73.05 
69.87 
85.71 
100 
54.98 
76.92 
75 
56.16 
50.0 
55.32 
53.88 
100 
54.44 
73.36 
85.83 
48.29 
57.42 
70.43 
85.71 
100 
68.18 
84.62 
82.35 
66.22 
66.67 
67.38 
59.90 
100 
69.02 
87.22 
100 
54.71 
78.11 
78.81 
100 
75.0 
68.16 
61.10 
83.87 
61.54 
71.43 
67.77 
100 
40.46 
74.93 
55.93 
83.4 
71.10 
93.50 
77.24 
100 
100 
66.88 
64.71 
86.21 
62.71 
80.00 
64.08 
100 
100 
77.09 
63.12 
87.38 
64.87 
88.57 
78.05 
Table 13 is an extended analysis of the Herfindahl Index for both number of 
audit clients and fees to industry segment for all the five years. The trend for 
Herfindahl Index is similar to concentration ratio. The average index in the year 
2001 increased slightly for both audit clients and fee, which is 0.27 (1977:0.26). 
Table 13: Summary of Herfindahl Index 
Industry/Year 
Construction 
Consumer 
Product 
Hotel 
Infrastructure 
Industrial 
Product 
Mining 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trading 
Services 
Ave HI 
1997 
No. of 
clients 
0.30 
0.27 
0.36 
0.25 
0.25 
0.31 
0.29 
0.28 
0.27 
0.27 
0.26 
Audit 
fees 
0.38 
0.27 
0.43 
0.54 
0.26 
0.30 
0.37 
0.25 
0.26 
0.27 
0.26 
1998 
No. of 
clients 
0.31 
0.27 
0.36 
0.44 
0.26 
0.26 
0.34 
0.28 
0.29 
0.27 
0.25 
Audit 
fees 
0.39 
0.34 
0.48 
0.52 
0.32 
0.27 
0.43 
0.31 
0.37 
0.32 
0.25 
1999 
No. of 
clients 
0.28 
0.23 
0.36 
0.37 
0.25 
0.27 
0.25 
0.29 
0.28 
0.26 
0.26 
Audit 
fees 
0.46 
0.43 
0.54 
0.89 
0.41 
0.35 
0.44 
0.50 
0.43 
0.38 
0.25 
2000 
No .of 
clients 
0.25 
0.26 
0.33 
0.56 
0.26 
0.25 
0.27 
0.27 
0.28 
0.26 
0.26 
Audit 
fees 
0.44 
0.59 
0.51 
1.00 
0.51 
0.37 
0.44 
0.41 
0.62 
0.47 
0.26 
2001 
No. of 
clients 
0.27 
0.26 
0.50 
0.33 
0.26 
0.30 
0.28 
0.29 
0.38 
0.29 
0.27 
Audit 
fees 
0.41 
0.65 
1.00 
0.65 
0.48 
0.39 
0.72 
0.43 
0.55 
0.38 
0.27 
In this study, the Herfindahl Index does not give a conclusive evidence of 
decline in audit competition. This is due to the marginal increase/decrease of 
indexes that the change seems insignificant, as compared to those of 
concentration ratios. 
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The following paragraph provides a more meaningful analysis as it takes 
into account the statistical difference between pre- and post merger data. 
Table 14: Paired Sample t Test 
Paired t-test 
1997- 1999 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
CR4 (client) 
-3.19* 
-0.89 
-4.51* 
0.70 
- 1.09 
CR4 (fees) 
-4.01* 
0.06 
- 3.77* 
-0.38 
-0.96 
HI (client) 
-0.61 
-1.39 
1.74 
-0.04 
-0.56 
HI (fee) 
- 4.82* 
- 2.82** 
-3.17* 
- 1.88*** 
-0.44 
* significant level at one percent (2-tailed test) 
* * significant level at five percent (2-tailed test) 
*** significant level at ten percent (2-tailed test) 
The first row provides the result for pre- and post- merger (i.e. 1997/1999). 
Other pairs of years are also provided for comparative purpose. 
Paired sample t test reveals that the four firm concentration ratios are 
significant (at one percent level) both based on number of audit clients for 97/ 
99 and audit fee for 97/99. However, paired sample t test for Herfindahl Index is 
only significant for fees. Hence, three out of four measures indicated that 
significant change in audit market pre- and post merger. This suggested that 
the merger between PriceWaterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand did affect the 
audit market concentration. Thus the null hypothesis is rejected. In other words, 
the merger increased audit market concentration significantly. 
Conclusion 
It is obvious here that the market share captured by the Big 5 increased in the 
years 1999, 2000 and 2001 (post merger years) as compared to those in 1997, 
although there is an exception in the Infrastructure industry in the year 2000. 
The Herfindahl Index for 1997 shows that most of the industries are well 
distributed among the Big 6 except for Construction and Mining sectors in 
terms of audit clients. However, in terms of audit fees there are auditors that 
dominate a particular industry. The domination continues in the post year merger 
of 1999, 2000 and 2001. The average Herfindahl Index for audit fee shows a 
significant difference during pre and post merger years. 
The concentration ratios of post merger (1999, 2000 and 2001) increased as 
compared to that of pre-merger. This means that the Big 5 still dominates the 
audit market in Malaysia after the merger. Our findings support the conclusions 
Audit Firms Merger and Audit Market Concentration 
of Thavapalan et al., (2002) study that shows concentration (as measured by 
the percentage of clients and audit fee for the top four auditing firms) has 
increased in Australia. 
Using the widely used statistical measurement, i.e. the Herfindahl Index, 
we found that the number of industries auditor concentration has increased but 
not significant. Minyard and Tabor (1991) stated that generally, the Herfindahl 
Index increases as the pro forma number of audit firms decreases. When the 
number of auditing firms is reduced to show merger effect, the Herfindahl Index 
for an industry will always be at least equal to that prior to the reduction in the 
number of auditing firms. The Herfindahl Index will increase with each merger 
unless either or both of the merging auditors audit no clients within that industry. 
The increase in Herfindahl Index indicates that the Big 5 auditing firms have 
dominated competition. 
The paired t test showed a four-firm concentration ratios are significantly 
higher during post merger period (1999) in number of audit clients and fees. 
However, the four-firm Herfindahl Index is only significant for audit fees. This 
may indicate lower competition level in the audit industry. Another study by 
Hilwani et. al (2003) showed that the merger did not affect the level of fee. 
Further study should examine this issue to determine the level of competitiveness 
in the market for audit services in Malaysia. Perhaps, the use of data for small 
auditees would enable researchers to test the audit market competition more 
directly as espoused by Simunic (1980). 
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